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Abstract
This paper concentrates all OlLe particular aspect of providing commllnication sccllrity: Iirewall:;
between domains of lnlsl. We argue Utili signaling support for providing scalable security services is
a design rcqulrcmcnl. On this basis we outline a reference model for firewall tcdlIlOlogy. It captures
the current slate of t111~ art and proves suitable for connection-oriented high-performance networks.
TIle architcctUI:e is an improvement in network mallOlgemcnt and provides a controlled exposure
of the internal network structure lo lIle olltsidc, and lransparency to the user. Its componcnts are
endpoint authentication, call admission control, cOllllcctioll authenlication, audit, and a dislribulcd
architecture with centralized policy. Thc paper discusscs implicalions of this rderence model for tile
design of signaling prolocols.
1 Introduction
Data cOIlllllunications networks have become all infrastructure resource for businesses, corporations,
government agencies, and academic institutions. IIowever, new technologies introduce new threats, and
networking not only puts corporate resources, plans and data at risk, but ultimately the company's
reputation and potential survival. Protection froIll network-enabled threats cannot be achieved by a
single technology or work practice. While this paper concentrates on a particular aspect of providing
communication security, firewalls between domains of trust, we want to stress that a balanced approach
to network protection draws from several other fields: such as physical security, personnel security,
operations security, and communication security.
For the purpose of this paper we adopt the following \\forking definition for firewall technology:
Firewall Technology: Mechanism 10 help enforce access policies ab011t communication traffic (1)
entering or leaving networks.
In classic firewall technology access control security services for distributed systems were provided in an
ad hoc f<!Shion. To date there is neither a well designed reference model nor any theoretical background.
'Published in Proceedings Open Sign/lling Works/lOp, Colwubil1 Ulli ..."n;ily, New York, NY, Ocl. 14.-151996.
The integration of classical TCP/IP networks and new highspeed network technologies, such as ATM,
offers new opportunities to address some of the current shortcomings of firewall technology. Additionally,
the development of new networking technologies offers the opportunity to investigate the question of what
capabilities it must provide and where.
\Ne are stepping back and arc asking what security services need to be present in connection oriented
networking technologies to support a wide variety of applications ranging from native ATM devices to
complex distributed systems. Tn particular, we are investigating what basic mechanisms need to be
available in their supporting signaling protocols.
1.1 Previous Work
The value of firewall tecllllology has long been recognized. Several research papers describe the different
approachc:; ([2], [1], [101], [16], [21], [26],[10], [8], [13] and [4]). In the past two years a few text books on
the topic have been published ([5], [23] and [9]).
Little has been published on firewall issues in connection-oriented communication networks. In a stan-
dards contribution, Lyles ([17]) motivates the development of authenticated signaling as part of the ATlH
signaling standards: a fundamental prerequisite for our approach. Smith and Stidd ([21\]) were the first
to propose concrete solutions to the problems of user authentication and billing for services and prod-
ucts provided by end systems in 13-ISDN. Further development and prototyping efforts arc umlerway by
several groups, e.g., Tarman et al. at Sandia National Laboratories ([HI] and [25]), Bullard et al. at Fore
systems, and the ATM Forum ([11]).
Tarman et al. at Sandia National Laboratories focused mainly on hardware and software encryption
in high speed networks, a..'i well as signaling support for encryption, authentication, and key exchange.
They did not put any emphasis on the issue of network layer access control.
"Domain Type Enforcement (DTE)" was introduced by Boebert and Kain in [6]. It investigates issues
in access control that arc relevant to our approach. The DTE approach is actively being used by a grOltp
at Trusted Information Systems.
2 Background
2.1 Current Firewall Technology
Firewall technology in TCP/IP internetworks provides a mechanism to help enforce access policies on
communication traffic entering or leaving networks. Usually an "inside" network domain is protected
against an "outside" untrusted network, or parts of a network are protected against each other. A firewall
is a security architecture placed on the data transmission path between networks, or on a bastion host
placed in a demilitarized zone network between the inside and the outside.
In current firewall practice, security policies arc translated into simple lists of rules. Each rule explicitly
or implicitly allows or denies data through the firewall ba..'3cd on some semantic interpretation of the data
contents. Rules interact with each other, for example through their order. Different types of firewalls
operate on different layers of abstraction of passed data: network layer (packet-filtering), transport layer
(circuit-level), and application layer (application-level).
2.2 Packet Filters
At the lowest level of abstraction, data is transmitted in packets, called IP datagrams in a TCP/IP
network. In a packet-filtering firewall each datagram that arrives at the firewall router is passed to a
packet filtering mechanism. The filter discards or forwards packets according to specified rules based on
the fields of the TCP/IP packet header, e.g., source and destination addresses and port numbers. The
rules operate solely on the contents of the datagram, because no context is maintained across datagrams
that belong to the same connection.
2.3 Circuit-Level Gateways
Circui t-level firewalls group packets into connections, e.g., TCP connections, by maintaining state across
packets. This association is typically done by inserting a proxy process into the connection. An alter-
native approach is to build "Oil the fly" tables at the packet forwarding process based on examining the
SYN/ACE: flags of TCP packet headers. In the case of "on the fly" table creation, the firewall imple-
ments a policy of forwarding packets belonging to conllections initiated from within the firewall, but not
trusting connections initiated from the outside. If proxies are present, processes on the inside cannot
directly establish connections to destinations on the other side of the firewall either, but rather connect
to the proxy. The proxy then uses access rules to determine if the connection should be established or
blocked. Circuit-level gateways can implement elaborate access control mechanisms, including authen-
tication and additional client/proxy protocol message exchanges. Programs initiating connections must
be modified in order to use circuit-level proxies. Duly minor changes are necessary, but the availability
of source code, the heterogeneity of system platforms, the distribution of programs, and the education
of the user population make this a difficult task.
2.4 Application-Level Gateways
Application-level firewalls interpret the data in packets according to particular application protocols.
Essentially they are proxies: special purpose implementations of the applications whose purpose is to
add security features and to prevent the applications from being misused. They arc application specific:
for each application, a different application-level firewall must be provided.
2.5 Discussion of Firewall Technology
Security firewalls neither provide perfect security nor are free of operational difficulties. They do llOt.
protect against malicious insiders. There is no protection against connections that circumvent the firewall,
e.g. modems attached to computers inside the firewall. There is only limited protection against tllnneled
connections and novel attacks. Because current practice does not provide a check of internal system
configuration against the firewall access lists, changes in system configurations may inadvertently produce
security holes. Firewalls offer only limited protection against data driven attacks, such as the contents
of downloaded Java applets. Because of the reactive character of the concept of firewalls there is only
liWe reason to believe that effective protection against novel attacks is guaranteed. Indeed, there is a
history of attack scenarios that initially succeeded against firewalls and that prompted advances in the
state of the art.
Firewalls are useful because many currently deployed computing systems and networked applications
do not provide strong security. Some argue that firewall technology is more than just a retrofit patch
for shortcomings in systems and protocol design. Even in the presence of secure hosts and network
protocols, firewalls are desirable because they serve as a centralized focus of security policy and as a place
to collect comprehensive security audits. They improve administrative control and network management
via controlled exposure of internal network structure, topological flexibility, and transparency to the user.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, firewalls represent a technology that is widely accepted, available,
and justifiable to management in charge of purchasing decisions.
Overall it is important lo understand that in spite of their advantages firewalls arc neither a panacea
nor a replacement for good host security, but an additional protection mechanism.
3 Firewall Reference Model
In this section we describe a reference model for firewall technology in accordance with Definition (1).
The reference model is designed to provide strong basic security services and integration with other




























Figure 1: Reference Model of Firewall Technology
Figure 1 depicts the high level view of our generic model of network security. It combines the security
services of endpoint authentication, connection authenticity, data integrity, (data confidentiality, ) call
admission control, and accountability through the application of a combinat.ion of security functions,
such as authentication, and audit.
Services are displayed as functional blocks. As we explain in the following sections, our model is more
distributed than this compact representation suggests. The coupling between functions can be tightly
integrated to very loose, functions may be replicated and distributed across a large distributed sys-
tem. The concepts described in the figure are not restricted to an end-ta-end, end-to-intermediate, or
intermediate-to-intermediate discussion, nor to unilateral authentication. As we describe in the following
paragraphs, an iterative application of this figure allows us to argue abOllt a combination of endpoints,
as well <IS mutual authentication.
Figure 1 is useful in explaining the conceptual interaction between components. An iJlitiator attempts
a certain access request to a target - in our framework a connection establishment request. The access
enforcement function located in the communication path between these two principals requests the
authentication of the initiator and eventually the access control decision, and acts upon the results
of these functions. Access enforcement function, authentication function and access control decision
function all have writ~ access to the audit function.
3.1 Assumptions
Our reference model takes advantage of the notion of connection oriented communication. Although we
discuss the reference model primarily with respect to the asynchronolls transfer mode (ATM), it can be
applied to other connection oriented protocols, such as Tep, including those with soft state connections,
such as RSVP flows. We assume the existence of a secure public key distribution infrastructure and a
naming service. Furthermore, we assume that the binding between communicating principals aJld their
associated keys cannot be compromised. We require the integrity of the trusted computing base and the
appropriate strength of utilized cryptographic algorithms and parameters.
To satisfy Defmition (1), we require five essential clements:
1. Endpoint Authentication
2. Domain Ba.'>ed Call Admission Control
3. Connect.ion Authenl.ication
4. Audit
5. Centralized Policy with Distributed Service and Enforcement
3.2 Endpoint Authentication
All connections traversing the network perimeter are positively identified by their authenticated end-
points, which can be labeled "unknown".
Authentication provides assurance of the claimed idenl.ity of an entity. Entity authenl.ication provides
corroboration of the identity of a principal, within the context of a communication relationship. A
principal is an entity having one or more distinguishing identifiers associated with it. Authentication
services can be used by entities to verify the purported identities of principals. Examples of principals
in our framework are network service access points (NSAPs), and possibly higher layer entities strongly
bound to those NSAPs, such as server processes or even users.
It is necessary that the identifier be interpretable at any place along the connection establishment that
is involved in the authentication and access control process. If identifiers have global significance this
requirement is trivially satisfied. TTowever, this is usually not necessary. If an endpoint cannot be
authenticated, or its identifying label cannot be interpreted, its identity is labeled as "unknown". It is
l.he responsibility of the security policy to comprehend this case.
Distinguishing identifiers arc required for unambiguous identification within a security domain. They
can be distinguished at a coarse level by virtue of group membership, or at the finest degree of granular-
ity identifying exactly one entity. The term claimant is used to describe a principal for the purpose of
authentication. The authentication verifier is an entity which is or represents the entity requiring an au-
thenticated identity. Authentication between a claimant and a verifier is called unilateral authentication.
An entity involved in mutual authentication will assume both claimant and verifier roles.
Authentication methods rely on one or a combination of the following principles: something known (e.g.,
password), something possessed (e.g., security token), some immutable characteristic (e.g., biometric
identifier), trust (e.g., third party information), or context (e.g., address of principal).
There are authentication schemes with and without trusted third party involvement (see [20, Figures
1,2]). In the simple case no trusted third party is involved. The claimant establishes his identity with
the verifier through a dired exchange of authentication information. Third parties can get involved in a
variety of ways: in-line (a trusted entity intervenes directly in an authentication exchange between the
claimant and the verifier, e.g., ftp proxy), on-line (one or more trusted parties are actively involved in
every instance of an authentication e.\:.change, e.g., Kerbcros), off-line (one or more trusted parties sup-
port authentication without being involved in each instance of authentication). See [20, Figures 3,4,5].
Our architecture combines the two schemes of in-line and oIT-line authentication. In-line authentica-
tion is used to execute the authentication protocol between claimant and intermediary. In our model
authentication between intermediary and verifier is based on trust, because they belong to the same
domain of trust and administration. Off-line authentication is ul.ili",ed by the intermediary or verifier
for verification of public key certificates.
3.3 Domain Based Call Admission Control
Call admission control decisions are based on explicit policies that act on the security domain membership
of connection endpoint identities.
Our model of access control includes two main principals: the initiator l and the target. Iniliators can
be human beings or computer-based entities that access or attempt to access targets. The connection
establishment is the subject of access control requests. Targets represent computer-based or communi-
cations entities to which access is attempted. The access enforcement function is located on any possible
path between initiator and target and is part of the trusted computing base.
The access control decision function decides upon the access request by the initiator to the target.
Information taken into account by the access decision function arc the identities of initiator and target,
the access request, contextual information, as well as the security policy implemented.
Domain ha.~ed access control takes a hierarchical approach to dealing with the scaling issues of access
control. It is infeasible to specify security policies exhaustively in terms of all possible participating enti-
ties in a globally interconnected system. Domain hased access control allows to represent the structural
relationships among entities in a set theoretic approach, e.g., users call belong to a group of engineers,
or files can belong to a certain project.
A fair amount of research effort has been spent in investigating the semantics of access control. Several
publications propose languages as tools for the specification of access control policies and their enforce-
ment. A rich set of theories and existing implementations can be utili",ed. The idea of Domain Type
Enforcement as one particular instance of domain based access control goes back to [6].
Authentication and access control arc inherently related. If we want identifiers to identify as high level
an entity as possible, the labels can become arbitrarily complex. In general it is infeasible for a low level
authentication module in the network laycr to perform its operation on this scale, hccam,e certain high
level information necessary to perform the access control decision is not present at the network layer. This
problem is described in [18] where MoIfet and Sloman argue that general, application-independent access
control is infeasible. Tn [22] Roscheisen and Winograd give an example that shows that the approach of
security negotiation in all but the simplest cases becomes a complex coordination problem that can easily
lead to deadlock situations. Participants in the negotiation do not know a priori what information the
pccr requires to make the local access control decision. Including all data that can possibly be needed
in the access request is prohibitively expensive and possibly violates privacy concerns of the requester.
Because of these issues our model needs to be one of verified delegation. It is the role of the firewall ill
complex transactions to ensure that communications occur only with entities (e.g., programs) which are
trusted to enforce the security policy appropriately, e.g., a ftp server wbose file system security is known
to be appropriate for anonymous np access.
3.4 Connection Authentication
Connection authentication provides assurance about the authenticity of sender of data in a connection
and the integrity of the transmitted data. This becomes important once endpoint authentication aJld
call admission control have been performed. The identity of the sender needs to match the initially
authenticated identity. It is important to note that illtegrity assurance is part of connection authentica-
tion. Although possible, and often desired for other valid reasons, it is not necessary to assure integrity
through encryption of the whole data stream - a common misconception. Integrity and confidentiality
services serve different purposes and have very different characteristics.
3.5 Audit
All components of the system need the opportunity lo record information in a consistent manlier for usc
by notincation utilities, audit trail analysis, intrusion detection engines, and billing agents.
3.6 Centralized Policy with Distributed Service and Enforcement
The elements described above are distributed and enforced along the path of the connection. In particular,
they do not have to be located directly at the network perimeter as classically required by firewall
I In ollr model claimants for aUlhentieation purposes are idenlical wilh inilioloI'li for access control.
techllOlogy. The main argument here is scaling.
Indeed, the avoidance of the ne~work perimeter becoming a performance bottleneck (as is currently the
case) is a compelling argument for moving or distributing some of the functions further into the network.
Consider the scenario where access control verification and enforcement can be negotiated between the
network perimeter (or possibly a sequence of modules along the way of the data connection) and the
end system. After the initial authentication there might be a cascade of access control decisions to be
performed, based on the granularity of access control enforcement at a certain module.
One special case of this it the possibility of complete trust into a certain protocol stack, rUllning on
machines inside the boundary of trust, implementing all firewall security services.
In a different scenario the distribution of funcl.ionality might be configured at runtime, based on the
capability of some involved modules. For example, depending on the capabilities of the operating system
that is running on the end system, the access control decision made at a previous node can be different.
That approach has operational advantages over current firewall technology. It does not depend on an
absolute trllst relationship among all components in the protected network. It also allows more "plug
and play" type configuration, where system capabilities arc detected at runtime.
Non trusted protocol stacks, or stacks that implement only subsets of the firewall secmity services call
be identified at the network boundary via their clldpoint identifier in the CONNECT message. Access
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Figure 2: Reference Example
3.7 A Generic Scenario and Example
The following generic network access scenario illustrates the application of the previously explained
clements of the reference model.
• Originating principal A initiates a connection to destination principal B. A and B are located on
different sides of the network perimeter that is being protected. A and B can be any of a large set
of principals, such as hosts, network interfaces, processes, users, etc.
• As part of the connection attempt the originator creates its credentials for the authenticated call
setup, e.g. at al'
• After the connectioll request arrives at the destination's nctwork boundary the authentication mod-
ule located at that virtual boundary verifies the authenticity of A. The connection establishment
attempt may be terminated at this point if the authentication fails.
• The call admission control decision anywhere between the <lllthentication module and principal B
calculates and enforces its access control decision. The access might be refused at this point and
the connection torn down. The decision regarding the access control module to be invoked can
be dynamic, based on a negotiation between the boundary switching process and the end point in
question.
• A positive access control decision might call for further action, such as the validation of the func-
tionality of an enforcement module at B, or the exchange of enforcement parameters with it.
• Oncc the call is established, A and B can communicate. Tf so desired connection authentication is
provided on the data stream on an end-to-end basis.
4 Implications for Signaling Protocols
The previous section described what capabilities are required in order to build firewall technology ac-
cording to Definition (1). This section invcstigatf'_'> their implications for signaling protocols. We discuss
the implications for Q.2931, the ATM signaling protocol. Our claims and conclusions are validated by a
prototype implementation of the reference model.
Conceptually, we need to provide security services that affect
• call establishment and clearing protocol messages,
• data traffic, and
• the signaling system as a whole.
The relationship between these and the fundamental clements is as follows: Call establishment and
clearing protocol messages arc affected by "endpoint authentication" and "domain based call admission
control". Data traffic is affected by "connection authentication" . The signaling system as a whole needs
to provide support for "audit", and the "centralized policy and distributed service enforcement".
4.1 Endpoint Authentication
Endpoint authentication requires the introduction of a new illformation element into the signaling pro-
tocol. This information element contains endpoint identification information and identifies which au-
thentication protocol and algorithms are used, as well as protocol and algorithm specific information.
Appendix A serves as an example for an authentication information element that was used in our pro-
totype implementation2. The field message type identifies the signaling message type that is being
authenticated, e.g., SETUP. Ideally, no information present in any other mandatory information element
should be replicated in the authentication information clement.
2Not" that some information \Va.<; replicated that is pr"s"nL in oLher information c1emenLs, simply for practicnlity of
impl"mentation.
Ullilateral or mutual authentication can be achieved by a variety of well known authentication protocols
within the limitations of the Q.2931 protocol mcssage flow, i.e., oue message authentication. One such
protocol is described in Appendix B. It relics on public key cryptography and synchronized clocks.
Unilateral authentication of the initiator of a connection is achieved by one authenticatiOll information
element addcd to the initial SETUP message..For mutual authentication, the destination of a connection
would generate a CONNECT message with an additional authentication information element certifying
the authenticity of the destination.
This proposal is therefore sufficient for unilateral and mutual authentication between any two par-
ticipants: end-te-end, end-to-intermediate, intermediate-to-intermediate. Authentication verification
(unilateral and mutual) does not need to be pedormed by the final destination in the authentication
proc('.5S, but can be performed by any intermediary system with access to the signaling message OIl the
destination's behalf. Verification and any possible actiOll prompled by the result of the verification can
therefore be delegated to any trusled intermediary, in particular "firewall switches" located at the logical
network boundary.
Nested authentication (authentication of several entitics within one message, e.g., end-to--cnd AND end
to-intermediary) is a simple extension to our approach, where multiple authentication clements call be
present within one signaling protocol message. If the data covered by the authentication information
clement is chosen carefully, assurance for the integrity of a large portion of the protocol message is given.
In conjunction with access control this mechanism can be utilized to protect against denial of service
attacks by authenticatillg the source of RELEASE messagf'_'>.
4.2 Call Admission Control
Call Admission Control reqllires the signaling system to perform or use the services of the access control
function and enforce its result. If no aulhentication information is present ill the protocol messages, a
default "unknown" identity is used as the subject for the access control decision requcst.
Rot.h initiator and destination of a connection have opportunities to enforce access policies, as well as
intermediate nodes. Connection release needs to be su bject to access control in addition to authentication.
It is not sufficient to record who released a connection, but to ensure it happened according to security
policy.
The degree of coupling between access enforcement function and access control decision function is im-
portant. A collocation of the two modules may have advantages with respect to efficiency and timeliness,
however, au access control decision function that serves several access enforcement functions may reduce
the need to distribute access control information.
4.3 Connection Authentication
Connection authentication provides assmallce about the authenticity of the sender of data in a con-
nection and the integrity of the transmitted data. Connection authentication can leverage off endpoint
authentication to determine the initiator of a connection. However, connection authentication still needs
to validate that all data received at the destination was indeed sent by the originally authenticated
initiator. This protects against threats of active wiretapping, such as connection highjacking, e.g., [12J.
The second aspect of connection authentication is the assurance of integrity of transmitted data.
Both components can be provided by the application of cryptographic mechanisms, e.g., a periodically
transmitted hash value of previously sent data, signed by a key shared among t.he two connection end-
points. Such keys can easily be derived from public key information utilized by the initial endpoint
authentication together with an update message, such as proposed in SKIP ([3]). At the receiving side
delivery of data is verified, which can introduce jitter. It is important to choose the granularity of the
data unit for which integrity is enforced carefully ill order to optimize the tradeoff's involved between the
introduction of jitter, computational overhead, and the amount of security assurance gained. A natural
choice is to use the protocol frame size as data unit, e.g., AAL5 frames. Each frame would be followed
by an DAM cell containing the digital signature for the preceding frame. Rekeying can also be achieved
through an DAM cell, again in a similar fashion as in SKTP ([3, Section 1.9]).
Connection authentication is maintained on a per connection basis. "Signature" messages containing the
digital signature for preceding data units and periodic "key resynchronization" me.'>sages are sufficient
mechanisms to provide for connection authentication.
Confidentiality
Accordillg to Definition (l) confLclentiality is not part of our reference model. However, one can argue
that a confidentiality security service is an important service in any security architecture. We therefore
include this brief section on confidentiality. The discussion of implications for signaling for a confiden-
tiality security service are similar to the discussion on conncctiOll authentication. Typical data unit.s
subject to encryption arc ATM cells or whole frames. There is no llecessity of "Signature" DAM cells,
but for "Rc.,>ync" messages containing initialization vectors to accomplish recovery from encryption syn-
chronizatiOll loss. See Tarman et al. [25, Section 8.1] for details.
4.4 Audit
Audit does not affect the signaling protocol flow, however it requires any implementation of a signaling
protocol to provide the necessary calls to the audi t function. \Ve cannot stress strongly enough the
importance of a secure audit system for the purpose of billing, intrusion detection, and any form of post
mortem or audit trail analysis.
All the above discussed mechanisms and implications can be added lo a signaling protocol, slLch as
Q.2931 without prohibiting usage of non security aware Q.2931 implementations. This allows for a
gradual transition towards a secure infrastructure.
5 Conclusions
Our study shows that the concept of firewall technology is viable in connection-oriented highspeed
networks, such as ATM..
We cOllsider the security services of endpoint authentication, domain based call admission control, COIl-
nection authentication, and audit as essential elements of our reference model for firewall technology.
Furthermore, the flexibility of choice of location of services and their enforcement, together with a cen-
tralized security policy allow our model to scale to large networks.
The paper investigated the implications of this model on the design of signaling protocols and the asso-
ciated signaling system. The discussion and our prototype implementation show that simple extensions
to the signaling protocol Q.2931 and the data message lIow are sufficient to implement this referellce
model.
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A Authentication Information Element
We defillC the authentication information element according to [15, Section 5.4.5.1 and Figure 5-23].














bit 7-6 :::: 0 - coding standard: LTU-T
bit 5 flag:::: 0 - in agreement UNI 3.1
bit 4 = 0
bit 3-1 IE action indicator:::: 0 - in agreement UNI :1.1
OxOlfc _ 508d size of IE. 111 total 512 byles.
508 bytes available for the authentication value
A.2 Authentication Information Element - Body
Harne j,n type description
opcode I u_char Opcode for requc.,>ts
result 1 ll_char Result codc
Protocol .~llccific data:
-message type I u_char Message type
·protocol I u_char protocol identifier
·nonce..no 4 long Nonce number
•nonce_time 8 long [2] Nonce Timestamp
"hash alg. I u_char hash algorithm used
·encryption alg. I ll_char encryption algorithm used
Endpoint identification data:
-destination NS1D 1 u_char destiuatioll Dame space identifier
·source NS1D 1 u_char source name space identifier
·destination 1D ~ u-int ID of receiver
·source 1D 4 u..i.nt TD of sender
·destination G1D 4 u..i.nt GTD of receiver
• source GID 4 u_int GID of sender
·destination socket 16 struct sockaddr Socket address of receiver
·source socket 16 struct sockaddr Socket address of sender
·called..atm~en I short ATM address of receiver
·called-atm-addr 20 u_char*
• called...sllb~en I short ATM sllbaddrcss of recei ver
- called...sub..addr 20 ll_char*
• calling-atm..len 1 short ATM address of sender
- calling-atm-addr 20 u_char*
-calling...sub~en 1 short ATM subaddress of sender
·calling...sub-addr 20 u_char*
Algorithm specific data:
signature 200 char [200] Cryptographic signature
B Single Message Authentication Protocol
B.1 Authentication Protocol based on Signed Hashing
In this protocol the hash valuc of an authentication message is encrypted by the private key of the sender.
After successful execution of the authentication protocol principal A (the claimant) has established
her authenticity with principal B (the verifier) and ensured the integrity of data message m. The
authentication message consists, for example, of a data message, a timestamp, a sequence number, and
identifiers for the participants of this protocol A and B. The data message m can be empty, if only the
authenticity of A is important. If In is not empty, this protocol establishes its integrity upon successful
execution. The data message may consist of the first n octets of the first IP packet for this connection and
a combination of information elements. The exact contents, coding, and layout for the authentication
message are defincd in Section A. This protocol is similar to current proposals in the IETF IP security
working group.
B.2 Assumptions
This protocol assumes that the private key of the sender is not compromised, and a secure public key
infrastructure exists, such as [7]. J(A, the public key of principal A is a public value. H may be cached
for future speedup.
Protocol
I. riA hA :=h(m,t1,nA,A,B)
2. A s:= {hA}K-'
A
3. A _ Bl~ (m,ll,nA,A,B,s)-(m·,ti,nA"A",B",s·)
4. B lookup J(A
5. B h n := {S·}KA
6. n hA:=h(m",ti,IlA,A",il")
time II A starts creating the authentication protocol message
time t'2 : B has received the authentication protocol message
time ttl : time window in which different sequence numbers are accepted.
B.3 Authentication Verification
After the last step of either protocol is completed, principal B performs a number of tests to determine
if the authentication has succeeded. The authenticity of A and the integrity of data message mare 110t
established if any single test fails.
evaluates to il'ue
1. (hA=Fhn)
2. (idcntity of rcccivillg node =F W)
3. (t, ~ (t, - t~, I,D







Principals participating in communication are denoted in capital letters A or B. A usually plays the rolc
of the initiator (sender), B the acceptor (receiver) of a connection (of data). If the role is not clear from
the context the principals arc additionally labeled with their role.
Messages that arc transmittcd ill packets are denoted by msg. Received messages are labeled with
a superscript " to denote that the data might have been changed during transmis.'iion by an active
wiretapper. Times are represented by ti, where the subscript i is used to distinguish between different
times. Numbers created by principal X are represented by nx.
j{ is the symbol for encryption keys. If it is important whose principal's kcy it is, we will add the name
of the principal as a subscript, e.g., J(A. J( and J<..·-l are a public key pair with j{-l being the private
key part. The same subscript rules apply. Encrypted messages arc surrounded by curly braces, with the
subscript stating the encryption key, e.g., {msg}K-l. Hash functions are abbreviated by hO.
A
